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NOTES
Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and Minimum Legal Fee
Schedules: Learned Professions and State-Action Immunity
The question of whether the minimum fee schedules promulgated
by state and local bar associations violate the Sherman Act1 has caused
2
considerable debate both inside and outside the legal profession.
Commentators have not only questioned the legality of these pricing
arrangements, but also the motives behind minimum fee schedules and
the results they produce.' In 1973 a federal court considered for the first
time the antitrust questions raised by the legal profession's use of minimum fee schedules. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar" a United
States district court ruled that minimum fee schedules constitute pricefixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 5 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 6 In
reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit vitalized the "learned profession" exemption from the antitrust laws, extended the "state action"
immunity from antitrust liability,7 and found that the practice of law,
at least the practice of examining titles in Fairfax County, Virginia,
does not sufficiently "affect" interstate commerce to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act.8
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1970).
2. E.g., Arnold & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.AJ. 655
(1971); Miller & Weil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972);
Morgan, Where Do We Go from Here with Fee Schedules?, 59 A.B.A.J. 1403 (1973);
Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price Fixing: A Per Se Violation of the Sherman
Act, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 439 (1973); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Bar Association
Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HAnv. L. Rlv. 971 (1972).
3. E.g., Arnold & Corley, supra note 2.
4. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1974).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974). On the day after
the Fourth Circuit handed down the Goldfarb decision, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice filed a complaint charging the Oregon State Bar with combining
and conspiring "to raise, fix, stabilize, and maintain fees charged by its members . . .
for rendering legal services." United States v. Oregon State Bar, Civil No. 74-362 (D.
Ore., filed May 9, 1974).
7. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
8. This note will discuss only the "learned profession" and "state action" defenses
accepted by the Fourth Circuit in Goldfarb. However, in regard to the interstate commerce test, the author is of the opinion that Judge Craven in his dissent correctly articu]ated and applied the test for determining when interstate c.mmerce is sufficiently af-
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The Goldfarbs contracted to purchase a home in Reston, Virginia on October 26, 1971. To finance the purchase, they obtained a
home mortgage, which required that they obtain title insurance. Thus
a title examination of the real estate had to be made by an attorney.
Unable to purchase the services of a Virginia attorney at less than the
rate prescribed by the locally adopted minimum fee schedule, the Goldfarbs paid an attorney the minimum rate and subsequently instituted a
class action against the Virginia State Bar and three local bar associations seeking treble damages for violation of the federal antitrust
laws. 9
The United States District Court found that the minimum fee
schedule was a price-fixing agreement, a per se violation of the federal antitrust laws. 10 Finding a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the district court
concluded that the Fairfax County Bar Association's adoption and distribution of a minimum fee schedule was a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act." The court dismissed the action against the Virginia
State Bar because "[Ila its minor role in this matter, the Virginia
State Bar was engaged in state action," and was, therefore, exempt
from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.' 2 The Goldfarbs and the
Fairfax County Bar Association appealed.
The Fourth Circuit unanimously agreed that the action of the
Virginia State Bar did not violate the federal antitrust laws. Judge
Boreman for the majority concluded that the State Bar came within
the state action immunity 3 from the antitrust laws set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.14 The court of appeals, however, reversed the district court's decision that the Fairfax
fected to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. 497 F.2d at 2123.
9. Two of the local bar associations, the Alexandria Bar Association and the Arlington County Bar Association, agreed to consent judgments prior to the trial of the
case. They were directed by the district court "to cancel their existing minimum fee
schedules and enjoined from adopting, publishing or distributing any future schedules of
suggested or minimum fees." 355 F. Supp. at 492 n.1.
10. Id. at 493-94.
11. Id. at 494, 496.
12. Id. at 496; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); text accompanying
note 50 infra.
13. 497 F.2d at 8-12.
14. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In a concurring and dissenting opinion in Goldfarb,
Judge Craven was unwilling to conclude that the Parker requirements for state action
immunity had been satisfied, but he found that the "minor role" of the Virginia State
Bar in the price-fixing arrangement was insufficient to justify imposition of Sherman Act
liability. 497 F.2d at 21.
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County Bar Association's adoption and publication of a minimum fee
schedule violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.15 Acknowledging that

"the fee schedule and the enforcement mechanism supporting it act
as a substantial restraint upon competition among attorneys practicing

in Fairfax County,"' 6 the court concluded that anticompetitive restraints
on the practice of law are not within the scope of 'the Sherman Act.

The court reasoned that law is a "learned profession" and not a "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the Act.' 7 In addition, the court
of appeals held that the restraining effect of the minimum fee schedule on the interstate business of financing and insuring home mortgages was "fortuitous," "incidental," and too "remote" to satisfy the

interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act.'
THE "LEARNED PROFESSION" EXEMPTION
The language of section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that "every contract, combination . . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states .

. . ."

is unlawful.' 9

There

is not express exception for professional activities and the statutory
language is "so expansive that courts have been reluctant to find exceptions." 20 The only extended analysis of the meaning of the word

"trade" in the Sherman Act was made by Chief Judge Groner in
United States v. American Medical Association.'
Judge Groner
pointed out that "[tihe phrase 'restraint of trade' had its genesis in the
common-law, and its legal import and significance is declared again
and again in the decisions of English courts. . . as well as in Ameri-

can decisions in many of the States. The Supreme Court has said that
Congress passed the Sherman Act with this common-law background in
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
16. 497 F.2d at 13.
17. Id. at 13-15.
18. Id. at 18-19. Judge Craven dissented from the majority opinion on the Sherman Act liability of the local bar association. Id. at 21-24.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
20. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Va. 1973). The
Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561
(1944), concluded "if exceptions are to be written into the (Sherman] Act, they must
come from the Congress, not this Court." See generally S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON,
FEDERAL ANrTRusr LAws 35-37 (1968).
21. 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C.Cir. 1940), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Su.
preme Court affirmed the result inthis case without reaching the question of whether
the term "trade" applies to the professions. See also United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950), inwhich Mr. Justice Douglas refers
to Chief Judge Groner's "extended analysis and summary of the problem."
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mind."22 At common law an agreement by an individual not to engage in the practice of his occupation, including the "learned professions," was considered an illegal contract in restraint of trade unless
the court found that the agreement was "reasonable."'2 Since these
"ancillary" restraints14 of trade were, and still are, illegal if unreasonable,25 it follows that a direct restraint on the practice of a "learned
profession" is also within the scope of the Sherman Act. Judge Groner concluded that "[the indutiable effect of . . . English and American [cases], is to enlarge the common acceptance of the phrase 'restraint
of trade' to cover all occupations in which men are engaged for a
livelihood." 6
Although the Supreme Court has stated that it is in the "broad sense
that 'trade' is used in the Sherman Act, '27 it has on two occasions sidestepped the opportunity to determine if "trade" in this "broad sense"
includes the professions.28 In American Medical Association v. United
States,29 the Supreme Court affirmed the result reached by Judge Groner for the court of appeals. The Court, however, avoided the question of whether the practice of medicine is a "trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act by focusing on the fact that the illegal anticompetitive activities of the local medical association were directed
against a business engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning
of the Sherman Act.
Seven years later, in United States v. National Association of Real
22. 110 F.2d at 707.
23. Id. at 708.
24. "An ancillary restraint refers to a covenant or a separate contract which is subordinate to the main lawful purpose of a larger transaction it is designed to effectuate.
Illustrative is a covenant not to compete accompanying the sale of a business or professional practice or a contract of employment." S. OPPENHEim & G. WEsrON, supra note
20, at 4.
25. See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 709 (D.C. Cir.
1940), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 476
(1940). See generally Note, Professional Responsibility-Covenants Not to Compete
Between Attorneys, 50 N.C.L Rav. 936 (1972). See also N.C. STATE BAR COon OF
PRoEssIoNAL REsPoNsmmr
DR2-108(A) which makes it a disciplinary violation for
an attorney to "be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment agreement
with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment of
retirement benefits."
26. 110 F.2d at 710.
27. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491
(1950); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
28. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.,S. 5191 528 (1943),
,9,317 U.S. 519 (1943),
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Estate Boards,3 0 the Supreme Court again sidestepped the "learned
profession" issue. The Court stated:
We do not intimate an opinion on the correctness of the application of the term "trade" to the professions. We have said enough
to indicate we would be contracting the scope of the concept of
"trade," as used in the phrase "restraint of trade," in a precedentbreaking manner if we carved out an exemption for real estate
brokers. Their activity is commercial and carried on for profit. 3 '
The Supreme Court's failure to consider the validity of the
"learned profession" exemption has allowed the professions to focus on
three older Supreme Court decisions in supporting a claim of Sherman
Act exemption. In Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,12 the Supreme Court
held that professional baseball was not subject to the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act, in part because the Court found that "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. ' 33 Although the Supreme Court has on two occasions affirmed its decision
in Federal Base Ball,3 4 the Court in Flood v. Kuhns5 explained that
Federal Base Ball and its progeny are "aberration[s] confined to
baseball. ' 6 In two other decisions, Federal Trade Commission v.
8
Raladam Co.37 and Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,
the Supreme Court in dicta stated that the "learned professions" are
not "trades" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The dicta in
these two cases "decided in an era of judicial antagonism to governmental regulation of business and commerce" 39 stand as the only affirmative support for an exclusion of the "learned professions" from
the scope of the Sherman Act.
Until the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldfarb, no court has found
enough vitality in the "learned profession" exemption to base a dis30. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).

31. Id. at 491-92.
32. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
33. Id. at 209.
34. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953).
35. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
36. Id. at 282. The arguments of other professional sports organizations that they
come within the scope of the exemption granted to baseball in Federal Base Ball have
been uniformly rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
37. 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
38. 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932).
39. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 23 (4th Cir. 1974) (dissenting
opinion).
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missal of charges of antitrust violations primarily on this defense.40 In
Northern California Pharmaceutical Association v. United States4
and United States v. Utah PharmaceuticalAssociation, 2 lower courts
imposed Sherman Act liability on professional groups. Those courts
found that the "commercial" aspects of the alleged anticompetitive
professional activities brought the professionals within the scope of the
Sherman Act.43 At the same time, because of the Supreme Court's dicta
relating to the professions, no court has declared that the exemption
does not exist.
The Goldfarb majority argued that the traditional belief in an
exemption for the "learned professions," as evidenced by dicta in Raladam and Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, is entitled to great weight.41
In the court's opinion, to overturn this traditional belief would amount
to judicial legislation.45 While this argument is analogous to that
made by the Supreme Court in justifying the continued vitality of Federal Base Ball,40 the "learned profession" exemption does not share
the history of professional baseball's exemption. The "learned profession" exclusion is supported only by dicta, while baseball's exemption is supported by three affirmative Supreme Court decisions. Faced
since 1922 with baseball's "aberrational," judicially granted exemption from the antitrust laws, Congress has failed to pass remedial legislation. The Supreme Court has found that this is "something other
than mere Congressional silence and passivity," concluding "that Congress as yet has had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to
the reach of the antitrust statutes. '4 7 In contrast, the dicta supporting the "learned profession" exemption has not stood as a red flag inviting affirmative Congressional action to close a gap in Sherman Act
40. E.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soe'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir.
1957), the court of appeal's opinion was based primarily on the absence of interstate
commerce, but the court included a statement that "the practice of [medicine] . . .is
neither trade nor commerce within Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act." Id. at 268.
41. 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
42. 201 F. Supp. 29 (D.Utah), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
43. Both cases involved agreements among pharmacists to fix the prices of prescriptions. See Alabama Optometric Ass'n v. Alabama State Bd. of Health, 5 TRADE
RE. REP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.) 1 68,914 (M.D. Ala. July 26, 1974). Cf. Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), in which the court
concluded that "an incidental restraint of trade absent an intent or purpose to affect the
commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant application of the antitrust laws." Id. at 654.
44. 497 F.2d at 19.
45. Id.
46. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
47. Id. at 283.
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coverage. The reach of the Sherman Act has continued to expand
into areas at one time thought to enjoy professional immunity, 48 while
the Congress has done nothing to stop this extension.
The Fourth Circuit also found justification for the "learned profession" exemption on the basis of extensive state regulation of the legal profession. 49 State regulation, however, brings immunity only if
the requirements of Parker v. Brown5" are met. The "learned" or
"unlearned" nature of the activity regulated by the state has never been
a consideration in the analysis of a claim of Parker immunity. If the
"learned professions" are to enjoy immunity from the federal antitrust
laws because of "the special form of regulation already imposed upon
those in the legal profession," that "special regulation" must meet the
requirements for "state action" immunity set out by the Supreme
Court.
STATE ACTION
In Parker the Supreme Court concluded ,that there is "nothing in
the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."5 1 The Court held that the California
Raisin Prorate Program, an anticompetitive agricultural marketing
scheme, did not violate the Sherman Act. The program "derived its
authority and efficacy from the legislative command of the state,"
and it was executed and enforced by state officials.
Since Parker, the Supreme Court has failed to refine its definition
of the scope of the "state action" immunity. Although Parker dealt
specifically with immunity for state officials acting under the mandate
of legislative command, the case has been interpreted to confer antitrust immunity on private persons who engage in anticompetitive activities under a similar mandate.52 When extending the Parker exemption to activities of private parties, the lower courts have agreed
48. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Department of
Justice has been very successful in recent years in getting consent decrees in cases it
has brought against professional groups challenging their fee setting arrangements. Cf.
United States v. American Institute of Architects, 1972 Trade Cas. 92,091 (D.D.C.);
United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 1972 Trade Cas. 91,972 (S.D.N.Y.).
49. 497 F.2d at 14-15.
50. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
.51. Id. at 350-51.
52. See Kintner & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23
AM. U.L.Rv.527, 530 (1974).
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that the proposition that there was government participation "only begins the analysis, for it is not every governmental act that points a
path to an antitrust shelter.""
The anticompetitive activities must be specifically authorized by
legislative command and aimed at achieving some legitimate state objective. 54 In addition, the activities of the private parties must be

"actively supervised" by independent state officials. 5 General supervision over the private parties is not sufficient to invoke "state action" immunity in the majority of federal courts.5 0
57
In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
the Fourth Circuit departed significantly from this standard. The

court rejected an argument that the "active supervision" requirement of
Parker was not satisfied because the Virginia State Corporation Commission had not affirmatively approved promotional practices of
VEPCO alleged to violate the Sherman Act.

The court stated: "The

argument is not without merit but the conclusion is not inevitable unless one equates administrative silence with abandonment of administrative duty. It is just as sensible to infer that silence means consent,
i.e., approval."' 8 The conclusion of ,the Fourth Circuit that the potential for state regulation satisfies the "active supervision" requirement of Parker has been characterized by one court as an "unwarranted hyperextension of Parker."' 9 The Fifth Circuit in Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co."0 expressly declined to adopt the Washing-

ton Gas Light reasoning. The court stated: "The Parker exclusion
applies to the rates and practices of public utilities enjoying monopoly
status under state policy when their rates and practices are subjected
53. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286,
1294 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
54. E.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d
25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
55. E.g., Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.
1971).
56. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Kintner & Kaufman, supra note 52, at 533.
57. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
58. Id. at 252.
59. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp.
1153 (D. Hawaii 1972). See also Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444
F.2d 1011, 1018 (3d Cir. 1971); Note, State Action Exemption-PotentialState Regulatory Control Exempts Private Party-Tying Arrangements-Reduction in Price of
Buried Power Lines for Builders Installing Major Electrical Appliances Does Not Constitute a Tie-In, 85 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1972).
60. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
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to meaningful regulation and supervision by the state to the end that
they are the result of the considered judgment of the state regulatory
authority ....
Assuming arguendo that Washington Gas Light is a correct application of Parker,2 Goldfarb remains an unwarranted extension of
"state action" immunity. In Washington Gas Light the state regulatory
agency was directed by statute to fix the rate structure of public utilities."
In addition, the anticompetitive practices complained of in
Washington Gas Light were reviewed and disapproved by the regulatory agency after the antitrust action had been filed, but prior to the
court's decision."" In Goldfarb the Virginia Supreme Court had no
mandate to impose or approve fixed fee schedules for Virginia attor-

neys. Furthermore, there was no prior or
subsequent approval or dis65
approval of the price-fixing arrangements.

The statutes that granted power to the Virginia Supreme Court
and the Virginia State Bar to regulate the practice of law in Virginia
did not authorize or direct the state agencies to approve or disapprove
61. Id. at 1140. Georgia Power is in line with the interpretation of the Parker
"active supervision" requirement reached by the majority of lower courts. See Kintner
& Kaufman, supra note 52, at 530.
62. The validity of this assumption has been questioned by other courts. E.g., Gas
Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
351 F. Supp. 1153, 1202 (D. Hawaii 1972).
63. 438 F.2d at 251.
64. Id. at 252.
65. Judge Craven, who wrote the Washington Gas Light opinion, although concurring in the majority's result in Goldfarb as to the State Bar, did not agree that the State
Bar was excluded from antitrust liability under Parkerv. Brown. He concluded that the
Virginia Supreme Court would be "surprised to learn that it is engaged in active supervision of the State Bar's implementation of minimum fee schedules in Virginia." 497
F.2d at 21. Judge Craven concluded that the State Bar should not be subject to Sherman
Act liability because of the "exceedingly 'minor role' of the State Bar in this matter."
In reaching this result Judge Craven looked to the Supreme Court's decision in National
Association of Real Estate Boards, in which the Court affirmed the district court's decision that the National Association did not share the Sherman Act liability of the
Washington Real Estate Board. The Supreme Court concluded that although "we might
give the facts another construction . . . and find a more sinister cast to its actions ... ,
we cannot say that the District Court was clearly erroneous in finding that the National
Association . . . was not laced into the conspiracy to fix commissions." 339 U.S. at
495. In Goldfarb the district court did not find that the State Bar's "minor" involvement
in the implementation of the minimum fee schedules by the Fairfax County Bar Association was insufficient to justify imposition of Sherman Act liability. Instead it concluded
that in its minor role the Virginia State Bar was engaged in immune state action. The
state action immunity is discounted by Judge Craven in his dissenting opinion. To characterize the threat of disciplinary action against those who failed to follow the local bar
associations' minimum fee schedules as "minor," gives very little weight to the enforcement aspect of the alleged price-fixing agreement.
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minimum fee schedules. 6 6 Although the parties stipulated that ",the

Virginia statutes have given the Virginia court authority to make
questions involving suggested minimum fee schedules . . . questions

of ethics under the laws of Virginia, 6' 7 Judge Craven in his dissent correctly pointed out that the trial court expressly rejected this stipulation

as "a conclusion of law rather than a fact."6 Absent an express
legislative declaration commanding anticompetitive behavior as a part
of the regulatory scheme, courts have been very reluctant to imply a

grant of immunity from antitrust liability.6 9
CONCLUSION
The Goldfarb decision places unwarranted restraints on the
scope of the federal antitrust laws. The decision breathes new life
and respectability into the ,"learned professions" claim of antitrust

exemption, a claim that is supported only by antiquated dicta of the
United States Supreme Court. Neither the modem decisions of the
Supreme Court nor the common-law history of the phrase "restraint of
trade" supports such an exemption.

Judicial recognition of an anti-

trust exemption for the "learned professions" can only lead courts into
the quagmire of determining in future cases which professions are
"learned" and which are "unlearned." Because -the policy of pro-

hibiting price-fixing agreements is vital to the nation, the federal antitrust laws implementing that policy should apply to the profession
largely entrusted with enforcement of those laws.
66. VA. CoDE ANN. § 54-48 (1972), as amended (Supp. 1974) provides:
The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys at law and a code of judicial ethics.
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys at law.
67. 497 F.2d at 9.
68. Id. at 20.
69. See generally Semke v. Enid Automotive Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361 (10th
Cir. 1972); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.
1970); George R. Whitten, Jr. Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1970). This interpretation of the scope of the Parker "state action" immunity is supported by a long line of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the antitrust liability of
federally regulated industries. In those cases the Court concluded that absent an express
Congressional exemption from the federal antitrust laws, implied exemptions are "strongly disfavored" and will only be found in cases of "plain repugnancy between the antitrust
and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
350-51 (1963). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973);
Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Governmental Action, 48 TuL. L. Rav.
272 (1974).
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If the learned professions are to enjoy immunity from liability
when engaging in anticompetitive activities that would otherwise vio-

late the federal antitrust laws, that immunity must be found in the
Parker "state action" doctrine. Parker, however, requires much more

than a stipulation that the legislature granted a state regulatory agency
power to sanction generally price-fixing arrangements and an inference

that failure to act amounts to "active supervision."

If allowed to

stand, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goldfarb will mark a significant erosion of the scope of the Sherman Act.70
GEoRGF T. RoGISTER, JR.

Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Amending Rule 23 in Response

to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
The federal class action 1 has been praised as a device that pro-

vides for the small claimant a means of obtaining redress for injuries
to his legally protected rights.' Without this device many wrongs that
are too small in relation to the cost of obtaining relief would go unremedied.3 Recently, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin4 the United
70. The North Carolina State Bar and the North Carolina Bar Association have
acted to foreclose antitrust suits similar to those in the instant case. In 1972, prior to
the district court decision in Goldfarb, the State Bar repealed paragraph three of the
Canon of Ethics Number 12 relating to the use by attorneys of minimum fee schedules.
In addition, the State Bar rescinded all ethics opinions that discussed or related to minimum fee schedules. At the same time, the North Carolina Bar Association eliminated
from its Advisory Handbook on Office Management and Fees the schedule of fees for
specific services. Many local bar associations in North Carolina have followed suit and
have also wisely eliminated minimum fee schedules. Sitton, Professional Liability, 25
BAtR NOTES 84, 96-97 (1974).
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
Rpm. 501 (1969); Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANiTRUST L.J. 295 (1966); Kaplan, Class Action Symposium, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
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